Lincoln's Admiral Page 15
After witnessing the great potential of the steam-powered ram, the War Department commissioned Ellet to build a fleet of them for use against Confederate gunboats operating in the western rivers. Alfred Ellet, who was then a captain in the Fifty-ninth Illinois Infantry, was promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned as second-in-command of the nine old steamboats that Charles had converted to improvised rams. These boats carried no guns, relying on their speed and rams as their only weapons. They became known as the Ellet Ram Fleet. Alfred brought three officers and fifty men from the Fifty-ninth to serve as crews aboard the rams.
The rams had proved their worth in the battle against the Confederate River Defense Fleet protecting Memphis, and were an important part of Flag Officer Davis’s victory there on June 6, 1862. In fact, much to Davis’s dismay, it was a party of soldiers from one of the rams that actually landed in Memphis and ran the United States flag up over the city’s post office during the battle. Davis, like most naval officers, disliked the idea of having army boats manned by soldiers integrated into his command. In a stroke of tragic irony, the only casualty suffered by the Ellet Ram Fleet during the battle for Memphis was its creator, Colonel Charles Ellet. With his brother’s death, Alfred Ellet was promoted to commander of the little fleet.
Instead of sailing south from Memphis for Vicksburg, Davis permitted himself to be distracted by a campaign up the White River in Arkansas. Under instructions from Welles, Davis had sent a fleet of gunboats and army transports to aid the beleaguered army of Major General Samuel Curtis. Ellet refused a request from Davis that his rams be put under naval command, so they were left behind. Although the White River campaign had ended in victory, it was a hollow one that cost many lives and left the crews of the navy gunboats demoralized.
On June 18, tired of waiting for Davis to gather himself together and continue the advance downriver, Ellet informed the flag officer he was leaving Memphis and heading for Vicksburg. When he arrived north of the city, he learned that Farragut’s fleet was at anchor below, waiting for Davis to join the fight. Ellet knew the cautious Davis would not be arriving for at least several more days, so he sent a small party of soldiers, which included his son Edward and his nephew Charles Rivers Ellet, to make contact with Farragut. The soldiers slogged their way through the swamps on the bank opposite Vicksburg until they were below the city. There they commandeered a small rowboat and quietly approached the Hartford while she lay at anchor in midstream. They brought news that Davis was moving south slowly, but that the Ram Fleet was just north of the city and prepared to cooperate with Farragut in any way he wished.
It was with mixed emotions that Farragut received the news that Federal boats were above Vicksburg. He was glad someone was there, but would have been happier if it had been a regular naval fleet instead of the unarmed rams. He sent word back to Ellet, requesting that his boats keep watch along the stretch of the Mississippi from Vicksburg to the mouth of the Yazoo River. He also asked the colonel to send word to Davis that Farragut was waiting for him at Vicksburg. He told Davis he planned to attack Vicksburg in the next forty-eight hours, and the presence of his flotilla “would add greatly to the chances of success.” Having eyes to see for him above Vicksburg was extremely vital, especially since rumors persisted that the Arkansas might be coming down the Yazoo any day.
Impatient with the notoriously cautious Davis, Farragut decided to attempt to run the Vicksburg batteries without his help. His plan called for the fleet to pass Vicksburg on the morning of June 27. Starting the day before, Porter’s mortar boats were to try their best to reach the bluffs and put as many of the enemy guns out of commission as possible. The passage would be made in two parallel columns. The sloops were to form the starboard or eastern column, closest to the batteries. The Richmond was first, followed by the Hartford, then the Brooklyn. This would mean the larger ships could fire their broadsides at the enemy without fear of hitting other Union vessels. The port or western column would include the corvettes Oneida and Iroquois, and the gunboats Wissahickon, Sciota, Winona, Pinola, Kennebec, and the Katahdin. The corvettes were to precede the Richmond while the gaps between the sloops would be used for firing by two gunboats each. The Kennebec and Katahdin were to follow behind the Brooklyn, being the last to pass the batteries. Farragut ordered the sloops to maintain a wide gap between themselves so the gunboats could have a clear field to fire at the enemy shore without being forced to fire over the larger ships. He recommended the extensive use of shrapnel against gun crews.
This was to be an organized steaming past the batteries, not the mad dash the fleet had engaged in passing Forts Jackson and St. Philip. The flag officer wanted as much damage done to the defenses of Vicksburg as possible, since whatever survived the attack would still be there when the fleet headed south again. There were other differences between running the Vicksburg batteries and the earlier run past the New Orleans forts. Farragut mentioned these in a letter to his wife, written before the attack began. “The work is rough. Their batteries are beyond our reach on the heights. It must be done in the daytime as the river is too difficult to navigate by night. I trust that God will smile upon our efforts, as He has done before. I think more should have been left to my discretion; but I hope for the best, and pray God to protect our poor sailors from harm.”
The day before the attack was to begin, Porter brought his mortar boats up to within two miles of the city and began a steady bombardment. While there was some heavy damage to buildings in the city, the height of most of the batteries protected them from the mortars, many of which fell short of their targets. Porter’s boats put on a spectacular light and sound show, but accomplished little damage of any military value.
The attack was postponed until the early morning of June 28, when the signal to get under way was given. At 2:00 a.m., two red lights were hoisted at the mizzen aboard the Hartford, and the Federal ships raised their steam and began to move. The mortar boats kept up their constant barrage as the fleet approached the batteries. Porter brought his gunboats as close as possible to lend their firepower, and the ships and boats opened their own fire as they neared enemy targets. Most of the Federal shells that were aimed at the bluffs fell short, and the hillsides below them were lit with the explosions and fires of spent shells.
As Farragut had ordered, the Union ships moved slowly, pouring a raking fire at whatever enemy positions they could reach. The guns on the bluffs, as well as those that had been located along the shore, were briefly silenced by the broadsides but returned each time the firing sloop moved on. At one point, the Hartford actually stopped at Farragut’s order, to permit the Brooklyn and her accompanying gunboats to catch up. As was his habit, when the firing caused dense smoke to cover the river, Farragut climbed to the mizzen rigging for a better view of the battle. This time it almost cost him his life. A few minutes after the officer commanding a nearby gun crew had coaxed him down, the rigging where he stood was carried away by an enemy shell. The same shell cut the lines on his flag, dropping it to half mast and causing the other vessels to think he had been killed.
With shells flying in all directions, every ship moving upriver suffered damage, some more serious than others. By 6:00 a.m., the fleet had dropped anchor four miles north of Vicksburg, out of range of the enemy guns. Missing were the sloop Brooklyn and the gunboats Kennebec and Katahdin. These last three ships in line failed to make the passing, because of a misunderstanding in their orders. Captain Craven of the Brooklyn thought Farragut had instructed that no operational batteries be left behind. When he halted to attempt to silence several batteries, the guns on the bluffs concentrated on his ship and the nearby gunboats. The intensity of the shelling caused all three to withdraw back downriver.
Farragut was now above Vicksburg, but to what purpose he could not tell. Surprisingly, he had lost few men, only fifteen killed and thirty wounded. But without a large number of troops he could not subdue Vicksburg, and unless the army attacked the city’s defenses, they would be there waitin
g for him when he returned, as he must, to the south before the level of the river fell so low that he could no longer move his ships.
Farragut’s successful passing of the Vicksburg batteries offered the people of the north only a mild salve for the pain they felt over Robert E. Lee’s campaign to drive Union forces away from Richmond, later called the Seven Days Campaign.
Given command of the Confederate forces defending Richmond on June 1, Lee quickly began to build a reputation that resulted in his becoming the most famous soldier of the war, on either side. By the end of June, the Army of the Potomac, under Major General George B. McClellan, which had earlier appeared to be poised to capture the Confederate capital, was in full retreat, and Lee continued to take the offensive against the invading force.
OUT OF SIGHT of the Vicksburg batteries, around the sharp bend in the river, the captains of the Union vessels rushed to a meeting aboard the flagship as quickly as each could drop his ship’s anchor. An anxious Farragut took stock of his fleet and realized that three vessels had not made the run past the batteries. He sent word to Captain Craven of the Brooklyn via an overland messenger. Fearing that the sloop and two gunboats had been severely damaged and forced to turn back, he wrote, “I hope your ship has not been disabled and that your casualties have not been great, but I am prepared to hear the worst.”
While he waited for Craven’s reply, Farragut sent the Wissahickon to the mouth of the Yazoo River to watch for the Arkansas. He did not want to get his ships caught between the Vicksburg batteries and the giant ram without some warning. Following breakfast with his captains, Farragut did the only thing he could do, now that he was above Vicksburg: search for forces that would enable him to capture the city or, at the very least, permanently disable its defenses. Using the services offered by Lieutenant Colonel Ellet of the Ram Fleet, Farragut sent communiqués to General Halleck and Flag Officer Davis, as well as an official announcement to the naval authorities at Memphis that the Vicksburg batteries had been passed. This message was to be forwarded to Washington.
To the Navy Department he wrote, “The Department will perceive from [my] report, that the forts can be passed, and we have done it, and can do it again as often as may be required of us. It will not, however, be an easy matter for us to do more than silence the batteries for a time, as long as the enemy has a large force behind the hills to prevent our landing and holding the place.” It was a cold report that transmitted the author’s feelings about being required to move so far upriver for so little gain. “I am satisfied,” he wrote, “it is not possible to take Vicksburg without an army of 12,000 or 15,000 men. General Earl Van Dorn’s [Confederate] division is here, and lies safely behind the hills. The water is too low for me to go over twelve or fifteen miles above Vicksburg.”
Farragut’s report provided his superiors in Washington with a detailed description of the passing of the Vicksburg batteries. He singled out several officers and men of his command for special mention, as he usually did when it had been earned by meritorious valor or hard work. To them, he added the names of General Williams, Colonel Ellet, “and the army officers of this division generally,” for doing “everything in their power to assist us.”
Although General Williams had brought 3,000 men with him, his force was still too small to do anything of value against the Vicksburg batteries. Frustrated by his inability to assault the town, he managed to place his own light batteries on the shore opposite Vicksburg. From there he added to the firepower of the fleet and was able to distract some of the city’s guns.
Farragut’s communications to Flag Officer Davis and General Halleck repeated his opinion that Vicksburg could not be taken without a large army. Major General Ulysses Grant would realize the truth in this statement when he undertook several unsuccessful assaults on Vicksburg during the next eighteen months. While Davis could offer no troops since he had none with him, he did rush his flotilla of ironclad gunboats south to aid Farragut. General Halleck, who commanded a large army, replied that the “scattered and weakened condition of my forces renders it impossible for me at the present to detach my troops to cooperate with you on Vicksburg.” This was a curious reply from Halleck, whose troops had taken and occupied Corinth, Mississippi, and were now virtually inactive. The general claimed he might be able to send an army within a few weeks, but Farragut knew he had little time left as he watched the level of the Mississippi River continue to recede.
Meanwhile, Captain Craven’s reply to Farragut’s inquiry arrived on the flagship. Craven laid much of the blame for the failure of the Brooklyn and her two accompanying gunboats to follow the main body of the fleet north of Vicksburg on Porter’s mortar boats and gunboats. He claimed that as his ship had passed across the front of the southern batteries, Porter’s boats had ceased firing, so that “all the batteries which had previously been partially silenced, immediately renewed the action, hailing a cross fire on this ship and the two gunboats.” He then went on to fault Farragut for giving him what he termed unclear instructions concerning whether the Brooklyn should attempt to silence all the Confederate batteries before proceeding upriver. Craven claimed he had asked Farragut before the run began, “was it your wish or desire for me to leave any batteries behind me that had not been silenced, you answered, ‘No, sir; not on any account.’” The interpretation of Farragut’s reply to Craven’s question lay at the heart of Craven’s failure to follow the flagship north of Vicksburg. Farragut believed his reply meant that Craven should not “on any account” expose his ship to enemy fire any longer than necessary. Craven understood it to mean he must stand before the batteries as long as necessary, until he had silenced them all. This actually would have been impossible for him to do, because the guns on the higher bluffs were beyond reach of all but a handful of the Federal guns participating in the engagement.
Farragut was furious over Craven’s misinterpretation of his orders. What made matters worse was the latter’s report concerning the condition of his ship, which the flag officer expected had been heavily damaged. “We were hulled but twice,” Craven reported, “one shot taking effect below water, on our starboard bow; and we received some damage to our rigging. We have no casualties on board.” This made Farragut even angrier since his own ship had received more damage running the batteries than had the Brooklyn, yet she had succeeded in her mission. He wrote back to Craven explaining that the captain had failed to quote the entirety of his instructions, which hinged on the words “When the vessels reach the bend in the river.” All ships and boats were to advance north beyond the reach of the batteries, because that, rather than an attempt to silence all the enemy batteries, was the objective of the passing. Furious over what he considered insulting treatment by Farragut, Captain Craven immediately asked to be relieved of his command. Uncharacteristically, Farragut agreed, replacing him with Captain Henry Bell, who had been serving as fleet captain. It was a shame that this misunderstanding led to the squadron’s loss of an able and talented captain. Perhaps the root cause was Craven’s obvious dislike for Farragut, something that might not have escaped the flag officer’s observations.
In any event, Bell was not very happy with his assignment. Like everyone else in the fleet, including Farragut, he wanted most of all to get out of the river before the water level dropped too far, and they were forced to remain there during the notoriously insect-infested summer. “This is a heavy blow to me and interferes with my calculations for getting free of the river,” he wrote.
Free of the river. As the days grew hotter, the swarms of insects thicker, and the water shallower, everyone wanted to get free of the river - everyone, that is, except the officials in Washington, who appeared to believe that by simply running past the Vicksburg batteries and linking with Davis’s fleet, Farragut could gain control of the Mississippi River. How wrong they were would soon become obvious.
The importance the Federal government placed on Farragut’s joining with Davis and gaining control of the river can be seen in a letter from Nav
y Secretary Welles to Farragut. Although the letter is dated May 22, 1862, communications between Farragut’s fleet and Washington was a slow process that could take several weeks. The flag officer probably received this dispatch sometime around the end of June.
“Sir: The Department learns with much pleasure that you have gone up the Mississippi. The opening of that river is the first object to be attained since the fall of New Orleans. The ironclads of the enemy have made an attack upon our flotilla in the west, and have been repulsed. They are mostly fitted up as rams, but are not equal to those you have already so gloriously extinguished.”
Welles then suggested that Porter’s mortar boats and gunboats should attack Fort Morgan, one of the forts guarding the entrance to Mobile Bay. He offered to send the Susquehanna, a side-wheel steamer similar to the Mississippi in Farragut’s fleet, to work with the mortar boats once they were able to enter the bay.
Farragut was annoyed and dismayed by Welles’s cavalier attitude toward the defenses of Mobile Bay and his lack of understanding of what could be accomplished by the fragile mortar vessels and their small gunboat escorts. He wrote Welles that he had no doubt the mortar boats had done “great damage” to the Vicksburg batteries, and had helped to distract the enemy gunners while the fleet ran past, but he believed they would be easy prey for the ironclad rams the Confederate Navy had stationed in Mobile Bay. As for the Susquehanna, she would be operating alone as the only large ship, and would have difficulty fighting off the large number of small gunboats in the bay, as well as the ironclads, without the assistance of other warships. Mobile would have to wait until a genuine fleet of warships supported by mortar boats, ironclads, and other vessels could be organized and sent there. Meanwhile, the flag officer responsible for much of the Gulf Coast of the Confederacy was stuck up the Mississippi River, and none too happy about it.