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  This situation continued until the early morning hours of January 1, 1863, when a group of rebel boats used the moonless night to attack the Union gunboats standing off the coast. Two “cottonclad” gunboats, the Bayou City and the Neptune, accompanied by their tenders, the John F. Carr and the Lucy Gwin, steamed into the bay as part of a combined land/sea attack to recapture the city. Aboard each gunboat were 100 dismounted Texas cavalrymen commanded by Colonel Thomas Green. Both gunboats, formerly river steamers, were armed with field artillery pieces, including a thirty-two-pounder on the Bayou City. On their decks were stacked bales of cotton to absorb the shells of enemy guns, and also as protection for sharpshooters stationed behind them - hence the term “cottonclad.” The bales were very effective - more so than one might imagine - at serving as a sort of armor plating. The overall attack was planned and directed by Major General John Bankhead Magruder. When Magruder took command of all Confederate forces in Texas at the end of November 1862, he made the recapture of Galveston his number-one priority.

  When the Union troops stationed in the city came under attack, Renshaw took his gunboat, the Westfield, closer to land in order to fire his guns at the attackers. The gunboat grounded on a sandbar from which it could not be refloated. The Clifton came to the aid of the grounded boat, but failed to pull her free. Meanwhile, the battle along Galveston’s waterfront intensified, and the rebel gunboats drew closer. On board the cottonclads, the Texas cavalrymen fired their rifles at anyone who moved on the decks of the Union boats.

  With shells and rifle fire pouring across his decks, Union commander Jonathan M. Wainwright drove his Harriet Lane into the Bayou City in an attempt to sink her. Both vessels suffered only slight damage. The riflemen aboard the cottonclad were briefly stunned by the collision, which reduced their firing for a time. Turning away from the Bayou City, the Harriet Lane was herself rammed by the second cottonclad, Neptune. The Union gunboat again suffered only minor damage. The Neptune received the worst of the ramming and pulled back from her enemy as she began to sink, costing the lives of many of those aboard her. Turning again, the Harriet Lane was rammed by the Bayou City. This time the two vessels were locked together. With the two boats unable to pull apart, the cavalrymen on the Bayou City immediately began boarding the Union gunboat. The badly outnumbered sailors put up a gallant struggle, but after a few minutes were forced to surrender. Among those killed in the action were Commander Wainwright, whose grandson would command troops at Bataan nearly eighty years later. The Confederate flag was run up the Harriet Lane’s mast by the cheering rebels as Union sailors and soldiers looked on from other vessels and the shore. Loss of the side-wheeler to the enemy proved to be a lasting embarrassment to Farragut and the entire United States Navy. For the remainder of the war, the navy searched in vain for her. Built in 1857 and named for the niece who served as White House hostess during James Buchanan’s presidency, she was the first steam-powered revenue cutter in U.S. service.

  While the Harriet Lane was being captured, Commander Renshaw continued his efforts to free the Westfield from her grounding. The remaining Union vessels began withdrawing from the harbor at Renshaw’s command. After refusing an offer of truce that would have permitted him and his crew to withdraw but leave the boat behind, Renshaw transferred most of his crew to the Clifton. Determined not to allow his gunboat to fall into rebel hands, he set her ablaze. Unfortunately, before he and the few men with him could get away from her, the gunboat’s magazine exploded prematurely. Renshaw and those with him were all killed in the explosion.

  Lieutenant Commander Richard Law of the Clifton led the four remaining Union vessels to safety outside the harbor. Left behind were the three companies of the Forty-second Massachusetts who were forced to surrender. Galveston remained under Confederate control for the rest of the war. Her value as a port for arriving war materials for the Confederate Army endured until the Union navy finally closed the Mississippi River to traffic from the Red River.

  Farragut was back at New Orleans when word of the Galveston disaster reached him. True to the impulsive nature that had earned him the nickname “Daring Dave,” the admiral’s first thought was to steam to Galveston immediately with his warships, recapture the port, and destroy the enemy’s vessels. He was talked out of doing this by Commodore Henry Bell, who had been promoted to this rank in August as reward for his service with Farragut on the Mississippi. Bell volunteered to take an expedition to the Texas coast to see what could be done about reestablishing the blockade of Galveston. This seemed to satisfy Farragut, who had the highest regard for his friend’s ability.

  Even Commodore Bell’s efforts were not without embarrassing moments, however. On the afternoon of January 11, 1863, one of his ships, the gunboat Hatteras, had a running battle with the famous rebel cruiser Alabama, under the equally well known Captain Raphael Semmes. The two ships steamed along together in almost parallel lines, firing broadsides into each other. Finally, after a quarter hour, Lieutenant Commander Homer Blake was forced to break off the engagement and surrender. The Hatteras was burning beyond control at two locations, and she had taken several hits below the waterline. Blake asked for help in removing his crew before the ship sank, and Semmes responded by sending his boats to rescue sailors from the sinking Hatteras and the sea around her.

  Twenty-eight miles away, Bell heard the firing and rushed his flagship, the Brooklyn, to the scene. Arriving too late, all he found was the flotsam that remained of the Hatteras, and a few sailors clinging to the debris. The Alabama and her prisoners were long gone.

  The blockade of the Texas coast continued to go badly, in part because of Magruder’s determined efforts to break it. Magruder widened his campaign to open Texas ports by sending two cottonclads armed with field artillery pieces and loaded with Texas infantry to attack the Union sailing ships off Sabine Pass. The attack was launched on January 21 and proved completely successful. The Union ships were nearly becalmed and unable to maneuver as the rebel steamers could. Both Federal ships on the Sabine Pass station, the Morning Light and the Velocity, were captured after a brief fight.

  Commodore Bell spent some time shelling Galveston, but was unable to launch an attack on the city because he had too few troops for such an encounter. Besides, Magruder had bolstered Galveston’s defenses by moving a large number of infantry and several heavy guns into the city. Nothing could be done but stand offshore and conduct as effective a blockade as possible. General Magruder infuriated the Federal navy by issuing a proclamation that the Texas coast was “open to trade” with all nations. Bell responded by declaring that any merchant vessel caught entering or exiting any Texas port would “be captured … and sent into an open port of the United States for adjudication.”

  Rear Admiral Farragut reluctantly left Pensacola for New Orleans on November 7, 1862, after receiving reports that the Confederate Army was building strong fortifications at Port Hudson. Sailing with him was his son, Loyall, who had traveled to Pensacola on a navy warship for an extended visit. Loyall accepted his father’s offer to serve as his secretary, and so became a part of the Hartford’s company. Several powerful batteries had already been put in place at Port Hudson, and Farragut knew his place was back in the river to deal with this new threat to Union control of the Mississippi River. Moreover, he had given up all hope of launching a combined sea/land attack on Fort Morgan and the other Mobile Bay fortifications in the near future. The army had suffered a series of disastrous setbacks near Richmond, Confederate forces had invaded Maryland, and troops could not be made available for Farragut’s project. General Butler had earlier committed troops from his command for a campaign against Mobile Bay, so Farragut had a second reason to revisit New Orleans.

  The Hartford, along with the Richmond and a group of gunboats, arrived at New Orleans shortly after noon on November 9. To Farragut’s dismay, Butler explained that his command was engaged in a series of campaigns throughout the region, and he could not spare any troops for Farragut’s use until those camp
aigns were completed. Instead, Butler urged Farragut to consider attacking Port Hudson until he could supply the manpower required for assaulting Mobile Bay.

  But, in a reversal of the previous year, the Navy Department urged Farragut not to go upriver until it had risen well beyond the minimum required by his ships. Farragut remained anxious to deal with Port Hudson, hoping perhaps that a victorious land/sea operation there would help him put together the expedition he needed for Mobile Bay.

  In response to Butler’s urging, Farragut sent four gunboats, under the command of Lieutenant Commander George M. Ransom, upriver to reconnoiter the fortifications at Port Hudson. On his return to New Orleans, Ransom reported that the Port Hudson fortifications had been completed and were situated in such a way as to be “capable of resisting more effectually than Vicksburg the passage of any vessel or fleet.” Within days of Ransom’s return, Butler changed his mind about attacking Port Hudson. Behind this change was a report from Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel, Butler’s chief engineer, that Port Hudson was garrisoned by at least 12,000 Confederate soldiers. Weitzel offered the opinion that the fortifications could not be taken by a force of any fewer than that number.

  The situation in New Orleans, and the outlook for some action for Farragut’s fleet, changed on December 16, with the arrival of six large troop transports. On board was Butler’s replacement as commanding officer of the Department of the Gulf, General Nathaniel P. Banks, and 20,000 additional Union soldiers. Banks brought with him instructions from the President to take whatever actions were necessary to open the Mississippi River to Union traffic and close it to Confederate use. A former governor of Massachusetts and a self-made businessman, Banks was one of a long list of politicians who received military commissions from a grateful President Lincoln when the war began. His wartime career had been rather uninspiring and would probably have been ended before he was assigned to New Orleans except for the personal intervention of Lincoln. The single feature of importance that Banks had over Butler was the force of 20,000 soldiers he brought with him. In them, Farragut saw the troops he needed to capture both Port Hudson and Mobile Bay.

  As the year 1862 came to a close, Rear Admiral Farragut began planning for his attack on Port Hudson. First, he had to persuade General Banks to reoccupy Baton Rouge so it could be used as a base against Port Hudson, and then commit the number of troops required to launch a combined attack on the dangerous fortifications themselves. Farragut’s hope of winning Banks’s support was a letter from President Lincoln introducing Banks to Farragut and requesting the admiral’s cooperation with Banks in opening the river. Banks also brought a photograph of the President inscribed to Farragut, who was flattered by the gift. He wrote Virginia that he and Banks were “likely to get along well.” Farragut’s relations with General Butler had always been good, with the latter cooperating in every way he could. But Butler had been constantly short of the manpower required to guard the city and engage enemy forces in the region. Because of this, Butler could offer only limited assistance, as he had at Baton Rouge and Vicksburg. Farragut hoped this condition was now corrected.

  On December 19, Farragut wrote Welles, “Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that on the arrival of General Banks with his troops I recommended to him the occupation of Baton Rouge. He approved of the move, and ordered his transports to proceed directly to that city. I ordered Commander James Alden, in the Richmond, with two gunboats, to accompany them and cover their landing. Baton Rouge is only twelve or fifteen miles from Port Hudson, and is therefore a fine base of operations. I am ready to attack the latter place and support General Banks the moment he desires to move against it.”

  THE DEFENSES OF Port Hudson were similar to those at Vicksburg in several ways. Both were located on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River. Both sites dominated the river from high bluffs that permitted defenders to fire down on enemy ships while they remained relatively safe from most naval guns. Ships approaching either location could not raise many of their guns enough to fire up the bluffs with any accuracy or achieve satisfactory height. The river above both series of bluffs made sharp left turns that forced northbound ships to reduce speed in order to negotiate the bend. The south-flowing current of the river was fast, usually about nine knots at Port Hudson. Now each of these Confederate strongholds was occupied by nearly 16,000 rebel soldiers. General Van Dorn considered Port Hudson as vital a stronghold as Vicksburg for the continued existence of the Confederacy.

  Opposite Port Hudson, on the western bank, was a flat, sandy plain that stretched back from the river and gradually rose to form a low plateau. Numerous small streams flowed from the plateau into the river. Although none of these was powerful individually, their combined strength as they emptied into the river had the effect of gently pushing ships toward the eastern bank. Under normal conditions, river pilots easily compensated for this, but in wartime, with the enemy high up on the bluffs, these streams pushed ships directly under the fire of powerful guns.

  Downriver at New Orleans, Farragut waited for Banks to decide when he would attack Port Hudson. Having his son with him, and time on his hands, gave him reason to accept invitations to the few social events in the occupied city. One of these was an opera sponsored by a ladies’ society to raise money for the poor. Farragut, doing what he considered his humanitarian duty, purchased a box for himself, Loyall, and several of his officers - even though he knew he was “giving my money to those who would not give me a Christian burial if they could help it.” Time dragged while Farragut’s active brain planned his campaigns against Port Hudson and Mobile Bay.

  On December 17, Baton Rouge had been occupied again by Brigadier General Cuvier Grover with 18,000 men. The river alongside the city was controlled by vessels of Farragut’s fleet under Commander James Alden of the Richmond. The capital of Louisiana was little more than a ruined shell of its former self, having suffered from the earlier naval bombardment and land battle. Grover did his best to maintain order among his troops, but there were frequent reports of looting and plundering. Slaves escaping from nearby plantations were attracted to the city in search of the freedom promised them by Federal officials. They were put to work cleaning up the town and rebuilding its defenses against another attack.

  Once he learned of the strength of the Confederate forces at Port Hudson, Banks proved as reluctant to move against the fortified town as Butler had been. Unknown to the admiral, Banks had informed the army’s general-in-chief, Henry W. Halleck, that his force was too small for a successful campaign against Port Hudson. Banks’s Army of the Gulf had fewer than 40,000 men in Louisiana. More than half his troops were nine-month enlistees with little or no combat experience. In detriment to their relationship, Banks attempted to shift some of the blame for his reluctance to attack Port Hudson onto Farragut, and told Halleck that the available naval forces were not strong enough for such a campaign.

  Farragut learned of these remarks from a New York newspaper. Infuriated by this backbiting, he wrote Welles explaining that his river squadron was “ready for action at all times.” On Farragut’s letter, Welles penned his own feelings that he “never doubted the readiness of Admiral Farragut to act.”

  In a letter to his wife, Virginia, Farragut wrote, “You will no doubt hear more of ‘Why don’t Farragut’s fleet move up the river?’ Tell them, because the army is not ready. Farragut waits upon Banks as to when or where he will go.”

  While some may have been critical of Farragut’s inactivity at this time, Navy Secretary Welles never lost confidence in his rear admiral. In a diary entry dated February 10, 1863, concerning a successful attack by two Confederate ironclad rams against blockading ships commanded by Flag Officer Samuel F. du Pont at Charleston harbor, Welles commented that it “was not what we expected of him; [du Pont] is not like the firm and impetuous but sagacious and resolute Farragut.”

  That Farragut was anxious to get upriver and wrest control of the section of the Mississippi between Port Hudson and Vicksb
urg from the Confederates is evident in the following account from Captain Thornton Jenkins. On January 20, Jenkins reported aboard the Hartford as Farragut’s new flag captain. Following introductions to the other officers in Farragut’s cabin, the admiral asked everyone but Jenkins to leave. According to Jenkins, Farragut told him, “I wish to have some confidential talk with you upon a subject which I have had in mind for a long time… . I have never hinted it to any one, nor does the Department know anything of my thoughts. The first object to be accomplished, which led me to think seriously about it, is to cripple the southern armies by cutting off their supplies from Texas. Texas at this time is, and must continue to the end of the war to be, their main dependence for beef cattle, sheep, and Indian com. If we can get a few vessels above Port Hudson the thing will not be an entire failure, and I am pretty confident it can be done.”

  Jenkins agreed with Farragut’s evaluation of the situation. He suggested the need for support by the army, to which Farragut agreed. However, as we have already seen, army participation in an assault against Port Hudson was not forthcoming.

  The impetus to strike upriver without the army was given Farragut by his adopted brother, David Porter. Promoted to acting rear admiral in charge of the naval forces in the upper Mississippi following Flag Officer Davis’s recall to Washington, Porter was as anxious as Farragut to close the Red River to enemy supply boats. When the rebel steamer City of Vicksburg was reported unloading supplies at the Vicksburg wharf after steaming down the Red River, Porter decided he had to take positive action to close the exit of that river to enemy use. He ordered Charles Rivers Ellet to take his dual-side-wheel ram, Queen of the West, under the guns of the Vicksburg batteries and ram and sink the steamer. Following that, he was to continue downriver and make every effort to close the Red River to enemy traffic. Charles Rivers Ellet, like all the Ellet clan, was a daring army officer who took naturally to naval river duty. At Memphis, he had led a party of his soldiers into the city while the battle was going on and raised the flag. He had joined his uncle at Vicksburg, and now, at nineteen, was a lieutenant colonel of the Mississippi River Brigade. His uncle Alfred was its commanding general.